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For every clever person who goes to the trouble of creating an incentive
scheme, there is an army of people, clever and otherwise, who will
inevitably spend even more time trying to beat it.I
By all accounts, health care reform is a treacherous undertaking. The
effort requires a massive investment of resources-not simply financial,
but also the type of political capital that can move constituencies away
from entrenched positions of self-interest and toward common ground.
Those with the most to gain from upending the current system of health
care distribution often have little political voice compared to those with
the most to lose. Alignment of the necessary financial, political, and
human elements is a rare thing indeed. For any state to navigate these
obstacles successfully, as Massachusetts appears to have done, is a
significant accomplishment.
Given these concerns, it is understandable that the drafters of the
Massachusetts plan did not focus on the system's potential for health
care fraud and abuse. Yet it is also unfortunate, because with few
exceptions, health care fraud is a crime of opportunity rather than one of
desperation. Thus, any reform effort that increases the opportunities to
commit fraud, such as increasing the number of players in the health care
system and the obligations imposed on them, may well end up losing
more money to fraudulent activities. The risk appears to be heightened
for reform efforts utilizing the Massachusetts model, which seeks to
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achieve universal coverage by building on existing third-party payers and
government programs rather than instituting a new single payer system.
As we have learned in other contexts, perhaps most importantly from
managed care, simply changing the financial structure of the health care
system does not necessarily remove the incentive for people to take more
from the system than they put in; it simply shifts the fraudulent behavior,
often in unanticipated (and less detectable) ways. As Professors Timothy
Jost and Sharon Davies have observed, "the fundamental human traits
addressed by the fraud and abuse laws-greed and venality-do not
disappear and are not tamed simply because arrangements for the
financing and delivery of health care are changed. These traits simply
manifest themselves in new forms or in new variations of old forms."
2
This aspect of human nature appears depressingly resilient, even in the
face of changes made with the most admirable of intentions. Rather than
determining whether people will cheat under a system such as the
Massachusetts plan, then, the question is how they will cheat-and
whether the system is capable of detecting fraud in its new guises.
The goal of this commentary is to highlight the ways in which the
Massachusetts model of health care reform may have the unintended
effect of permitting health care fraud to flourish, both by current market
players and by new parties who will be brought into the system. Given
the many public references to the bipartisan genesis of the Massachusetts
plan, it is worth noting that the prevention of health care fraud and abuse
is a bipartisan goal as well.3 Ultimately, then, health care reform and
fraud prevention need not be viewed as inherently incompatible.
II. FRAUD IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
In order to determine the effect of a multi-payer universal coverage
system on health care fraud, it is important to review what we currently
know about the problem. Fraud and abuse are frustrating constants in the
United States health care system. The first audit of Medicare fee-for-
service payments found that more than $23 billion had been paid out
improperly in fiscal year 1996 alone-an error rate of more than 13%.
4
2. Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder Drug for
Health Care Fraud andAbuse?, 31 GA. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1997).
3. Indeed, the federal government's Fraud and Abuse Control Program was one of the
bipartisan compromises generated by the failed Clinton health care reform effort. See Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 201, 110 Stat. 1936,
1992 (1996) (establishing a "Fraud and Abuse Control Program").
4. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, No. A-17-01-02002, IMPROPER FISCAL YEAR 2001 MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE
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Although the numbers have improved each year, auditors still estimate
that improper Medicare payments totaling $10.8 billion were made in
2006.5 Consistent with this focus, recent years have seen more funds
appropriated to the federal agencies with jurisdiction over health care
fraud, particularly the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department
of Health & Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General
(OIG). These investments clearly have paid off: the federal government
won or negotiated approximately $1.47 billion in health care judgments
and settlements in fiscal year 2005.6 Although the extent to which those
numbers can be extrapolated to the private sector remains uncertain, it is
clear that the overall magnitude of the diverted funds is large, and this
amount has proven resistant to virtually all eradication efforts. While it
may no longer be fashionable to insist that reducing health care fraud is a
quick and easy way to fund health care reform, the amount of money at
stake remains substantial enough to jeopardize many innovative reform
efforts.
A. Fraud, Abuse, and Waste
Not all health care "fraud" is equal-indeed, not every improperly
paid dollar is necessarily a dollar lost to fraud at all.7 One of the reasons
it is so difficult to either estimate or to eradicate health care fraud is that
the phrase encompasses several types of disfavored financial activities,
ranging from intentional efforts to misappropriate government money to
behaviors that are merely profligate with regard to the funds set aside for
health care. Although the terms are often used interchangeably (and may
be equally subject to many of the anti-fraud laws), it is important to
distinguish among the concepts of fraud, abuse, and waste.
8
PAYMENTS 1 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/cms/aO 102002.pdf (reviewing 1996
data).
5. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, IMPROPER MEDICARE FFS PAYMENTS
LONG REPORT (WEB VERSION) FOR NOVEMBER 2006 (2006), https://www4.cms.hhs.gov/apps/er
report/preview er-report.asp?from=public&which=long&reportlD=5&tab=2.
6. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2005 1 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2005.pdf.
7. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud: An Empirical Perspective, 22
CATO J. 151, 162 (2002) (arguing that OIG and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Studies audits
are not designed to measure true fraud).
8. For an overview of these concepts and their effects on the fraud and abuse debate, see
generally Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing Estimating, and Reforming
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, I I YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1994).
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True fraud involves actions taken with the intent to deceive. In
health care, this will most often involve a willful misrepresentation of the
relevant facts on which payers rely in making reimbursement decisions,
what Professor James Blumstein has called "raw fraud." 9 An example
would be a physician who bills for services never performed, or for
patients never treated. 10 Abusive behavior lacks the element of intent,
instead involving actions such as "gaming the system" by creatively
reading reimbursement rules to permit practices that violate the spirit, if
not actually the letter, of the law.' Abusive practices often straddle the
line between expenditures of medical resources made primarily in self-
interest and those made pursuant to good faith belief in medical
necessity, such as when a physician insists on performing two separate
procedures when both could have been performed more economically at
the same time. 12  Wasteful practices, by contrast, are not actively
fraudulent and do not seek to exploit uncertainty in regulatory rules.
Rather, the concept is most often used to describe activities that are not
cost-effective, yet persist because of other incentives in the current health
care system. 13 An example might be so-called "defensive medicine"
practices, where unnecessary tests and procedures are ordered out of fear
that failure to do so might lead to a malpractice action, or the persistence
9. James F. Blumstein, What Precisely is "Fraud" in the Health Care Industry?, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 1997, at A25. See also Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 8, at 463 ("Classic fraud involves the
misrepresentation of relevant facts combined with the detrimental reliance on that misrepresentation
by another party to the transaction."); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-92-69, HEALTH
INSURANCE: VULNERABLE PAYERS LOSE BILLIONS TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 2 (1992) (noting "fraud
generally involves a willful act") [hereinafter GAO, VULNERABLE PAYERS].
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 647 (1997) (alleging that psychiatrist
submitted bills for services not performed, including a bill for psychotherapy services for a patient
who was already dead).
11. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 8, at 463 ("[A]buse describe[s] instances of profligate
spending on medical care that is at the margin of fraudulent practice, in which the conduct in
question is permitted by the existing arrangements for medical care provision and financing.");
GAO, VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 9, at 2 ("[A]buse typically involves actions that are
inconsistent with acceptable business and medical practices.").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1530-31 (1994) (involving a physician
who was convicted of Medicaid fraud, and whose sentence was increased because of risks posed to a
patient when he performed a tubal ligation four weeks after delivering the patient's baby by c-
section rather than performing both procedures at one time. In his defense, the physician argued that
he did so to allow the patient to heal from the earlier surgery). As Mashaw and Marmor note,
"[c]ommon to all these cases is some plausible medical explanation for the procedure. Abuse lies in
the motivation imputed to the provider, in the suspicion that costs were increased for purposes
related, at best, only tangentially to producing a better medical result." Mashaw & Marmor, supra
note 8, at 464.
13. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 8, at 464-66 (describing how cost-ineffective practices
are often justified by some medical rationalization).
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of payer-specific billing systems when a universal billing form would be
less expensive.
1 4
While fraudulent, abusive, and wasteful practices all cause monetary
loss, the appropriate legal response to each activity may be different. At
one end of the spectrum, there is widespread consensus that intentional
fraudulent activity should be addressed through criminal statutes
imposing fines and imprisonment, powerful civil sanctions requiring
hefty statutory penalties and disgorgement of multiple times the
monetary gain, or exclusion from federal health care programs. 15 At the
other end of the spectrum, wasteful practices are often viewed as
demanding a systemic response-be that response something as
sweeping as medical malpractice reform, or as specific as the
development of clinical practice guidelines to advise busy health care
professionals on the best way to treat a particular condition.'
6
Abusive activities, however, are another matter. In large part, this
stems from the fact that abusive acts can be characterized in two starkly
different ways. From one vantage point, abusive acts are nearly as bad
as actively fraudulent ones-either due to the monetary losses caused or
to the belief that one who engages in such activities clearly has
demonstrated a disregard for the ethical rules that should govern
behavior in the health care industry.17 The proper response to abusive
acts, from this perspective, is nearly identical to that involving fraud.
Thus, many of the powerful criminal and civil statutes applicable to
health care fraud can be satisfied by proof of mental states that fall short
of traditional notions of "intent." For example, the civil False Claims
Act defines the "knowing" submission of false claims to include not only
14. Id. at467.
15. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000) (defining crime of "Health care fraud" and imposing up
to life imprisonment if a violation results in death); 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000) (setting forth provisions
of the civil False Claims Act (FCA), which imposes statutory penalty of $5000 to $10,000 per
violation, plus treble damages); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (increasing FCA statutory penalty by 10
percent, to a range between $5500 and $11,000); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2000) (listing grounds for
mandatory exclusion).
16. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74 (Vernon 2005) (amending medical
malpractice statute in order to reduce the amount of damages awarded to claimants); National
Guideline Clearinghouse, www.guideline.gov (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (providing public access to
evidence-based clinical practice guidelines, maintained by the HHS Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality).
17. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique
of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 239 (1999) (arguing in
favor of widespread agreement "that Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse is morally wrong and
fiscally harmful"); James Sheehan, Bio-Tech Fraud Reality or Fantasy?, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 11, 18 (2002) (arguing that fraud laws serve to "prohibit a breach of good faith and fair
dealing as understood in the community involving a deception or breach of trust").
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actual knowledge but also deliberate ignorance or deliberate disregard of
truth or falsity, with no proof of specific intent required.' 8 With the same
penalties applicable to both fraudulent and abusive acts, there appears to
be little incentive---coupled with a strong moral disinclination-to bother
with the distinction at all.
Viewed from an equally compelling perspective, however, abusive
acts are not simply inchoate frauds. Instead, such activities may involve
a "gray area that requires the exercise of judgment" on the part of the
provider. 19 As I have argued elsewhere, the way to achieve a long-term
reduction of undesirable activities in such gray areas is not higher
penalties but regulatory clarity-the practice of revising incomplete,
conflicting, and confusing regulatory guidance to make clear exactly
what is expected of the provider in the first place. 20  The failure to
separate fraudulent from abusive activities results not only in unfairness
to individual defendants, but more insidiously obscures the need for
systemic changes designed to address these loopholes-thereby
perpetuating an escalating cycle of abusive practices. While a health
care reform plan that focused on fraud and abuse might well make
headway in resolving these problems, several aspects of a multi-payer
universal health care system may instead have the effect of exacerbating
all three types of concerns, as well as the confusion among them.
B. The "Usual Suspects" in Health Care Fraud
Although the permutations of health care fraud and abuse may
appear to be endless, the activities in fact involve a relatively limited
population of actors-whom I call the "usual suspects." To modify a
taxonomy used by Professors Timothy Jost and Sharon Davies in the
managed care context, health care fraud involves relationships between
and among four basic actors: (1) the patients (or consumers) who receive
medical services that are paid for, at least in part, by some form of
insurance; (2) the purchasers (also known as sponsors or payers) who
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006). A similar interpretation has been applied under the criminal
false claims provisions. United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that a
"conscious avoidance" instruction can be used in a criminal false claims case when there is evidence
of the defendant's deliberate ignorance). Similarly, the Stark self-referral prohibition has no intent
requirement at all. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
19. Blumstein, supra note 9, at A25.
20. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12 J.L.
& POL'Y 55, 130-47 (2003) (identifying problem and calling for efforts to achieve regulatory
clarity); Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 206-16 (2001) (suggesting ways to
increase the legitimacy of anti-fraud efforts).
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pay for health care, a group composed primarily of private employers
and the state and federal government entities that sponsor public health
insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid; (3) the providers,
both institutional and individual, that render medical services; and (4) the
intermediaries that administer health care benefits, process insurance
claims, and sometimes bear financial risk (as in the case of a traditional
indemnity policy sold by a private insurer).2' Without being unduly
cynical, there is potential for fraud whenever two or more of these parties
interact.
How does such fraud occur? Patients, for example, may defraud
purchasers and intermediaries by falsely seeking to become entitled to
benefits, or by requesting coverage, of services they do not need-
schemes that can be as diverse as falsifying insurance applications,
participating in fake automobile accidents, or falsely claiming work-
related disabilities. 22 Similarly, a purchaser may misrepresent a benefit
plan to potential enrollees, fail to deliver the benefits promised, or
unlawfully seek to discriminate in the benefits offered to individuals on
the basis of considerations such as health status.2 3  In perhaps the most
commonly cited form of fraud, a health care provider may falsify bills in
order to obtain payment for services that were not performed, or for a
more expensive type of service than was rendered.24 Part of the impetus
for the Massachusetts reform effort came from concerns raised by a
similarly abusive provider practice: the failure of hospitals in the state to
aggressively screen uninsured patients for Medicaid eligibility, chiefly
because reimbursement through the state's Free Care Pool was greater
than that available through the Mass Health program.25 Finally, the
21. See Davies & Jost, supra note 2, at 380-83 (stating, "[c]onceptually, health care
transactions in the United States involve four parties: consumers, providers, purchasers, and
intermediaries") (citing Jonathan P. Weiner and Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A
Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 80-81
(1993)).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying 18 U.S.C. §
1347 to individuals who posed as passengers injured in staged automobile accidents for the purpose
of defrauding the New York no-fault automobile insurance program); Davies & Jost, supra note 2, at
383-84 (stating consumers may defraud purchasers "when they feign illness, disability, or financial
dependency").
23. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (2006) (permitting employee benefit plan participant or
beneficiary to bring suit under ERISA for benefits due); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting
group health plans from discriminating against individuals on the basis of health status under
HIPAA); Davies & Jost, supra note 2, at 384 (discussing the liability of purchasers who
misrepresent their benefit plans to consumers).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir. 1997) (describing various
forms of billing fraud); Davies & Jost, supra note 2, at 384 (discussing how providers can submit
claims for items or services not provided).
25. See State Watch: Massachusetts Attorney General Investigates Overbilling of State
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current health care system offers ample opportunity for fraudulent
behavior by intermediaries, including misrepresenting insurance products
to purchasers and patients, failing to deliver promised services to
patients, and failing to process claims promptly and accurately.
26
As we have seen in the context of managed care, while health care
reform efforts may change the alignment of incentives among these
parties, they rarely have the effect of completely eliminating the
temptation (let alone the ability) to commit fraud. Rather, as Professor
Pamela Bucy has noted, "the way we pay people affects the way they
cheat." 27 Thus, a provider who is reimbursed under a fee-for-service
system has a financial incentive to perform additional services for a
patient (or at least to submit bills for such services), while a provider
paid under capitation has an incentive to perform fewer services. Under
either approach, there is both motive and opportunity for the provider to
game the system. As the authors of the popular book Freakonomics
note, "Cheating may or may not be human nature, but it is certainly a
prominent feature in just about every human endeavor. Cheating is a
primordial economic act: getting more for less.",28 The question is, in
what ways do these temptations play out under a scheme of multi-payer
universal coverage?
C. Fraud Detection and Prevention
Before turning to the specifics of the Massachusetts reform plan,
there is one more issue to be addressed: given the myriad motivations to
engage in fraudulent and abusive health care behaviors, what strategies
are commonly used to prevent such acts from occurring? As I said at the
outset, health care fraud is primarily a crime of opportunity. There are
two basic ways of reducing its occurrence: (1) decrease the opportunities
for such fraud to occur, such as by closing loopholes and clarifying
regulatory gray areas; or (2) increase the level of deterrence, such as by
imposing higher penalties or increasing program oversight, so that an
actor who discovers an opportunity to commit fraud will calculate that it
Uncompensated Care Pool After Audit Finds Excessive Charges, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL'Y
REP., Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports/repindex.cfm?hint-3&DR_
ID=35409 [hereinafter State Watch] (alleging that hospitals "inflated charges to the pool to
compensate for shortfalls in Medicaid reimbursements").
26. See, e.g., Davies & Jost, supra note 2, at 386-87 (describing ways in which an intermediary
can limit access to services and engage in false marketing activities in a managed care environment).
27. Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud by Health Care Providers, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 1003, 1049 (1993).
28. LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 1, at 25.
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is not in his or her best interest to proceed. While a full discussion of
29this issue is beyond the scope of this Commentary, it is worth noting
the obvious corollary: changes in the health care market that have the
effect of creating additional loopholes or confusion, while decreasing or
holding steady deterrent strategies, can be predicted to result in increased
fraudulent and abusive activities. The tensions have been described by
Professor Fran Miller, who aptly observed that "[i]f we are to embrace
the principle of universal health insurance coverage, yet avoid investing
massive new resources in the health sector, reform must be structured to
minimize the potential for excessive private gain at the expense of cost-
effective medical care."
30
How do market-based universal coverage proposals, and the
Massachusetts plan in particular, fare under these criteria? For obvious
reasons, multi-payer systems are significantly more administratively
complex than single payer models. This complexity "renders fraud and
abuse easier for those willing to engage in it, and its decentralization
adds to the monitoring problems of federal, state and private officials.
31
As the General Accounting Office has noted, "[t]he health care insurance
system is a myriad of health care payers and methods of reimbursing
providers. This complex system itself becomes an impediment to
detecting fraud and abuse. 32 For this reason, a reform effort that builds
on the current multi-payer system is unlikely to achieve fraud control
through the strategy of regulatory clarification, and by necessity will
likely rely on the development of additional deterrence mechanisms.
Two examples illustrate this phenomenon: the new Medicare prescription
drug benefit, and the proposals for national health care reform debated in
the early 1990's.
29. For a good introduction to these issues, including an economic analysis of deterrence in
health care fraud cases, see Jost & Davies, supra note 17, at 265-313, and sources cited therein.
30. Frances H. Miller, Doctors' Conflicts of Interest (& Altruism) in the United States and
Great Britain, 27 IND. L. REV. 687, 697 (1994) (reviewing MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY &
MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (1993)).
31. Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 8, at 488. But see DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS
MEPHISTOPHELES 25 (2006) ("Medicare's proponents routinely brag about its low administrative
overhead. Of course, the figure is artificially low because Medicare has no marketing expenses, and
it uses employers, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administration to collect
and process its premiums.").
32. GAO, VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 9, at 13. See also Bucy, supra note 27, at 1022-
23 (arguing that health care reform efforts should include uniform billing and payment provisions in
order to reduce fraud); Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 8, at 483 (noting that "[m]anaged




The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 200333 created a voluntary prescription drug benefit for Medicare
beneficiaries, which went into effect in January 2006. 34  The new
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit relies on a network of regional
Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) that compete for patients on the basis of
price, drug selection, and expanded Medicare managed care offerings
that include drug coverage (Medicare Advantage). Although the
program has required the creation of a new administrative structure
within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 35 the
program relies on existing players in the health care market for the
delivery of these new services, including pharmaceutical benefit
managers, managed care'organizations, pharmacies, and pharmaceutical
company patient assistance programs. Not surprisingly, such an
administratively complex system clearly provides opportunities for
fraud; indeed the program may have set a record in this regard, with the
first reports of fraud in the transitional discount card program coming
almost before the program went into effect.3 6  While the speed with
which the first fraudulent schemes arose may have caught some off-
guard, the potential for fraud in the new program was well-recognized.
Both the law and regulations include numerous provisions targeting
financial misbehavior (particularly in regard to assistance for financially
disadvantaged patients), and Part D oversight is expected to comprise a
major element of the government's regulatory and enforcement agenda
in the coming years.
3 7
33. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
34. Id. at 2072-73.
35. For access to the CMS documents and data on Part D, see CMS, Prescription Drug
Coverage-General Information, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenln/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2007).
36. CMS, FACT SHEET: MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WARNED ABOUT DRUG CARD SCAMS, Apr.
22, 2004, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/fact sheet.asp?Counter-=1018
(describing attempts "to gain personal information from beneficiaries with the intent to scam the
beneficiaries" in several states).
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-3a(d)(4) (Supp. 2006) (creating civil penalty for
misrepresentation of pricing information by manufacturer); 42 C.F.R. § 423.752 (Supp. 2006)
(setting forth grounds for imposition of intermediate sanctions and civil monetary penalties for Part
D sponsors); Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623 (Nov. 7, 2005), (setting forth OIG guidance related
to drug assistance programs); CMS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL: CHAPTER 9 - PART D
PROGRAM TO CONTROL FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/PDB Manual Chapter9_FWA.pdf (providing "both
interpretive rules and guidelines for Part D plan sponsors on how to implement the regulatory
requirements"); Robert N. Rabecs, Health Care Fraud Under the New Medicare Part D Prescription
Drug Program, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 727 (2006) (discussing potential fraud and abuse
under Part D health plans).
1160 [Vol. 55
FRAUD IN UNIVERSAL COVERAGE
Congress demonstrated similar awareness of the fraud and abuse
potential inherent in multi-payer reform schemes during the Clinton
health plan debate in the mid-1990s. The Health Security Act was a
reform proposal of almost mind-numbing administrative complexity,
with a convoluted combination of public and private mechanisms used to
achieve universal coverage. 38 To counteract the enormous potential for
fraud in such an administratively complex system, the Act (as well as
many of the competing market-based proposals) incorporated a variety of
new provisions targeted at reducing fraud and abuse, such as extending
existing Medicare/Medicaid anti-fraud provisions to cover all payers,
increasing the number and amount of civil monetary penalties, and
creating a new class of federal health care crimes applicable to fraud
against any public or private health care plan.39 Indeed, it is fascinating
to note that while the core coverage provisions of the Act quickly fell by
the wayside, many of the anti-fraud provisions became law with the
enactment of HIPAA -40 -suggesting how easily a single-minded focus on
health care fraud can obscure broader policy goals. By contrast, the
single payer reform proposals would have controlled fraud and abuse
chiefly by extending existing Medicare/Medicaid anti-fraud provisions to
the states, with few new protections needed.41  These examples
demonstrate that federal lawmakers have long been cognizant of the fact
that market-based health care reform efforts likely will require enhanced
deterrence in order to counteract new incentives to commit fraud.
III. FRAUD IN UNIVERSAL COVERAGE: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXAMPLE
Given this history, how does the Massachusetts reform plan fare? In
short, the legislation creates many new administrative entities, gives both
new and old "suspects" additional motivations and opportunities to
38. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1994).
39. See id. §§ 5201-5441 (proposing changes to fraud and abuse provisions); Matthew P.
Harrington, Health Care Crimes: Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 126-42 (1994)
(describing fraud and abuse provisions in the various reform proposals). According to one Clinton
plan critic, "the disturbing thing about the proposal is its reliance on a number of ill-advised and, in
some cases, draconian criminal provisions, which, taken together, constitute an unprecedented
interference with the states' traditional role in law enforcement." Harrington, supra, at 145.
40. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a) (2000) (expanded exclusion authority); id. §§ 1320a-7a
(expanded civil monetary penalties provisions); id. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (extending Anti-Kickback statute
to all federal health care programs); 18 U.S.C. §§ 24, 669, 1035, 1347, 1518 (2000) (defining new
federal health care fraud crimes).
41. See Harrington, supra note 39, at 144-45 (noting the "single-payer proposal does not really




commit fraud, and includes relatively few penalties that could be
considered serious deterrents to engaging in undesirable behaviors.
These problems may not doom the Massachusetts plan, chiefly because
the state already has very strong anti-fraud laws in place. Nevertheless,
they raise serious questions about whether similar multi-payer reform
efforts can succeed in other states with less favorable anti-fraud
environments.
A. Complexity
By relying on a combination of public and private mechanisms to
increase health care coverage, like the Clinton proposal, Massachusetts
has created a highly complex and bureaucratic system. Although far
from a scientific survey, I count at least eight new governmental bodies
created by the law, including the Health Care Quality and Cost Council,
the Health Disparities Board, and the all-important Commonwealth
Health Insurance Connector Authority.42  Admittedly, administrative
complexity does not translate directly into fraud and abuse. But at the
very least, the number of new entities raises the possibility of duplication
and waste, especially in light of concerns regarding the future solvency
of the program in a state with historically high health care costs-and
little emphasis in the reform plan itself on cost and efficiency.43
B. New Suspects and New Motivations for the "Usual Suspects"
More important than the sheer number of state entities involved in
the new program is the complexity of the provisions they are asked to
administer. Because of the way the program is structured, many actors-
both the "usual suspects" and newer parties-will have motive and
42. See, e.g., An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch.
58, §§ 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 30, 45, 101, 2006 Mass. Acts (forthcoming), available at http://www.mass.gov/
legis/laws/seslaw06/sI060058.htm [hereinafter An Act Providing Health Care Access]. According
to one attorney who was involved in the drafting process, the legislation affected a total of nineteen
different state agencies. Christie Hager, Health Reform in Massachusetts: A Social Compact and a
Bold Experiment, Remarks at the Kansas Law Review Annual Symposium: The Massachusetts Plan
and the Future of Universal Coverage (Nov. 10, 2006).
43. In the words of one commentator: "To be blunt, Massachusetts is a very high-cost state for
health care, with a concentrated market of relatively inefficient providers already swimming in a sea
of dysfunctional public subsidies and crippling overregulation." Tom Miller, Massachusetts: More
Mirage Than Miracle, 2006 HEALTH AFFS.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w450, w452. See also Nancy C.
Turnbull, The Massachusetts Model: An Artful Balance, 2006 HEALTH AFFS.: WEB EXCLUSIVES
w453, w455 ("Managing the growth of health care costs is not a major focus of the new law. In fact,
some key provisions will increase health spending.").
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opportunity to engage in a variety of fraudulent and abusive activities.
This is chiefly due to the new obligations created under the law and the
relatively weak enforcement mechanisms in place to back them up.
The chief obligation placed on patients under the reform plan is the
so-called individual mandate, a requirement that as of July 1, 2007, all
Massachusetts residents over the age of 18 obtain health insurance
coverage as long as such coverage is deemed to be "affordable" for
them.4  A wide variety of coverage options will satisfy the mandate,
including employer-sponsored health insurance, Medicare and Medicaid
coverage, or an individual policy purchased through the Commonwealth
Health Insurance Connector (Connector) (including those subsidized by
the Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program (CCHIP)).
Although the drafters of the legislation hoped to increase the availability
of employer-sponsored health insurance, it seems clear that the law will
also have the effect of increasing the numbers of those purchasing
policies directly through the Connector-mediated individual market.
That might change, however, if the affordability loophole grows large
enough to swallow the rule: if many people ultimately cannot obtain
affordable care through the Connector, as some critics have predicted,
this may derail the entire health reform plan and result in waste on a
massive scale.45 Moreover, the CCHIP program, designed to provide
premium assistance subsidies to state residents with incomes below
300% of the federal poverty level, may invite abuse by individuals who
seek to obtain subsidies to which they should not be entitled."
The legislation also imposes significant obligations on purchasers,
most notably employers. Under the law's so-called "pay-or-play"
mandate, every employer with more than ten full-time employees that
does not make a "fair and reasonable premium contribution" to a group
health plan must pay an annual "fair share employer contribution" not to
exceed $295 per employee (designed to offset a portion of the costs
incurred by the state for free care for workers whose employers do not
offer insurance).47  This structure may provide an incentive for
44. An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, § 12.
45. See Susan Dorr Goold & Nancy M. Baum, Define "Affordable", HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 22, 22-24 (addressing affordability problems); Marcia Angell, Healthcare Plan
Needs Dose of Common Sense, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2006, at A 15 (estimating that individual
coverage in Massachusetts costs $7,200 a year).
46. See An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, § 45 (stating the requirements to
be eligible for participation in the program).
47. Id. § 47; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03 (2006) (defining an employer's "fair and
reasonable contribution" as either 25% of employees enrolled in the employer-sponsored group
health plan or the employer's offer to pay at least 33% of the premium cost). A small-group
employer may choose to meet its obligations by entering into an agreement with the Connector,
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employers not only to shirk their respective premium responsibilities, but
also to calculate the number of their full-time equivalent employees in
such a way as to fall outside the mandate. Other new employer
obligations include the payment of a "free rider surcharge" if employees
who are not offered health insurance use state-funded free care
48 adtemservices, and the mandatory offering of a section 125 cafeteria plan that
permits employees to purchase various health-related benefits on a pre-
tax basis.49
Although most of the statutory mandates fall on individuals and
employers, health care providers may wind up bearing the brunt of the
financial reallocation. One of the oft-mentioned reasons for the
feasibility of the Massachusetts approach was the state's well-funded
uncompensated care pool-a remnant of a prior failed health reform
effort that permitted hospitals to bill the state for the costs of treating
low-income patients rather than having to offset those costs by raising
prices to other payers.50 That pool, estimated at over $500 million in
2005, 5 provided ready-made funding for the new reform effort (most
notably the CCHIP subsidies). By reallocating these funds for insurance
premium subsidies rather than spending them on direct care,
Massachusetts is basically gambling that the population of people who
previously received free services will be able to obtain subsidized
insurance coverage. If this strategy works, the costs of care for this
population should be covered by the new insurance, and there should be
little need for a free care pool.
If the gambit fails, however, both patients and health care providers
will be caught in the middle. If the newly subsidized insurance does not
in fact cover the costs of care-either because individuals are not able to
take advantage of such subsidies or because the subsidized policies do
not provide adequate coverage of services-patients will still present
themselves at hospitals in need of care, but that care will no longer be
fully compensated under what remains of the pool. These pressures will
be heightened starting in 2008, when providers will be expected to
comply with performance markers in order to be eligible for increased
under which the employer must carefully coordinate premium payments with the Connector (and
CCHIP, if applicable to individual employees). An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note
42, § 101.
48. See An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, § 44 (addressing free rider
surcharge).
49. See id. § 48 (requiring cafeteria plans).
50. Jonathan Gruber, The Massachusetts Health Care Revolution: A Local Start for Universal
Access, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 14, 16 (describing the funding pool).
51. Id.
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Medicaid reimbursement. 52 In short, providers are likely to have strong
motivation to find creative ways to make up the lost funding-or, in the
alternative, to turn patients away, a result clearly not desired by the
legislation.
Nor are intermediaries immune from the obligations imposed by the
new law. The chief concerns are likely to be the truthfulness and
accuracy of the health insurance policies offered through the Connector,
and compliance with the guaranteed issue and other requirements in the
(soon-to-be-merged) small business and individual markets.53 While
these may be common concerns in the insurance industry overall, the
creation of the Connector will introduce novel pressures into the
marketplace. The Connector is designed to function as a clearinghouse
through which individuals can gain access to insurance policies that meet
certain minimal criteria.54 Because a new state entity is now interposed
between the insurer and the population of potential enrollees, there may
be incentives for insurers to bribe or otherwise try to influence the
Connector Authority decisionmakers to assure sure that their products
are included.55 More broadly, intermediary behavior may raise moral
and ethical concerns: will intermediaries take up the challenge and make
low-cost policies of value available to both individuals and employers, or
will the goal of affordable universal coverage remain illusory?
Finally, the Massachusetts plan rests substantial discretion with the
individuals who serve on the Connector Authority and the other public
bodies created by the legislation.56 As noted above, the individuals who
control the Connector may have both motive and opportunity to engage
in bribes or other forms of graft in connection with favorable treatment
52. An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, § 25. The legislation created a
Health Safety Net Trust Fund, but it is clear that this fund is to be used only as a last resort; hospitals
and community health centers are directed to aggressively screen patients for potential eligibility
under other state programs, including Medicaid and CCHIP. Id § 30. Therefore, providers who do
not receive increased Medicaid payment rates will no longer have the ability to selectively bill the
state for the difference. See State Watch, supra note 25 (noting hospital officials inflated charges to
the pool to compensate for shortfalls in Medicaid reimbursements).
53. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176J (West 2006) (outlining small group health insurance).
54. See id ch. 176Q, § 5 (West 2006) (limiting plans that may be offered through Connector).
55. Cf. Bucy, supra note 27, at 1039-40 (describing how managed competition models raise
"the potential for large-scale corruption, a type of criminality not seen much in the heretofore
privately operated health care system"). This may be analogous to payments made to induce an
insurer to include a particular drug in a restricted formulary. See OIG Compliance Program
Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731-01 (May 5, 2003) (warning that
"[1]ump sum payments for inclusion in a formulary... are problematic and should be carefully
scrutinized").




of insurance products. More globally, these individuals have the
potential to derail the entire reform effort over time by failing to
administer the program in a way that restrains costs, particularly if this
means that truly affordable policies cannot be offered. This threat is
particularly heightened in Massachusetts, a state with historically high
health care costs. 57  While not fraudulent or likely even abusive, the
potential for failure nonetheless raises the specter of waste on a massive
state-wide scale.
C. Penalties for Misbehavior Under the Massachusetts Plan
The Massachusetts legislation contains a number of provisions
designed to encourage participation in the key aspects of the plan. With
regard to the individual and employer mandates, however, the provisions
are rather limited, and ultimately unlikely to function as true deterrents to
those who would defraud or game the system. It is particularly
disheartening to find that many of the commentators who might be
expected to object on principle to these mandates, such as authors from
the Heritage Foundation, have indicated that they are not opposed to the
mandates because they believe the provisions are unlikely to have much
of an effect-a trend that likely does not bode well for the potential to
achieve the plan's broader goals.
5 8
1. Individuals
As noted above, as of July 1, 2007, Massachusetts required residents
over the age of eighteen to obtain health insurance coverage.
5 9
Compliance with this individual mandate is confirmed via the state tax
return. Failure to comply-at least when affordable coverage is found to
have been available-subjects the individual to a tax penalty. In 2007,
the penalty is the loss of the personal tax exemption; in 2008, the penalty
will increase to up to 50% of the cost of the premium of the minimum
insurance policy for which the individual would have qualified during
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting high health care costs in Massachusetts).
58. One Heritage Foundation Web Memo states that employers "can easily avoid the new
assessment by signing up to offer coverage to their workers through the Connector. Thus, the
provision is likely to have a negligible, or even no, effect." Edmund F. Haislmaier, The Significance
of Massachusetts Health Reform, HERITAGE FOUND., April 11, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/
Research/HealthCare/wm1035.cfm. With regard to the individual mandate, the same author notes
that it "is more onerous and philosophically objectionable, but it is unlikely to prove onerous in
practice." Id.
59. An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, § 12.
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that year.60 The penalty is satisfied by first retaining any tax
overpayments otherwise due the taxpayer, and then by collecting any
balance.
Unfortunately, there are several problems with this enforcement
mechanism. First, an individual insurance mandate is highly unlikely to
achieve 100% compliance. We can see this by analogy to the concept of
mandated automobile insurance, where even in Massachusetts (a state
with fairly high compliance rates) an estimated 7% of drivers fail to
maintain such insurance. 61  Moreover, while people may exempt
themselves from the automobile insurance mandate by choosing not to
drive, a comparable option is not available under the health insurance
mandate (unless an individual chooses to move out of state). To the
extent insurance mandates have not been completely successful in
assuring the compliance of even the sub-population of state residents
who drive, the assumption that Massachusetts will be able to enforce a
mandate applicable to the entire state population is highly questionable.62
In addition to the general weaknesses of mandates as a tool to
achieve universal health coverage, there are problems with the specific
enforcement mechanisms contained in the legislation. Similar to
requiring proof of insurance before a car can be registered, using the tax
return process to enforce the health insurance mandate is a mechanism
designed to permit the state to screen information submitted by a large
population of individuals. But there is a significant loophole: this
mechanism will not catch individuals who do not file tax returns, a
perennial problem even without this additional motivation. To the extent
many of the people who do not file tax returns are also those most likely
to lack health insurance, such as those with very low incomes, this
mechanism may fail to reach the very population that the plan was
designed to benefit.
63
Moreover, for non-risk-averse individuals who could afford to
purchase health insurance but prefer not to, taking a "wait and see"
approach under the law may be an attractive option. If the individual
becomes ill or injured, the mandated open enrollment periods, limited
60. Id.
61. Michael Tanner, The Wrong Road to Reform, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 25.
62. Id.
63. See Peter R. Orzag & Matthew G. Hall, Tax Facts: Nonfilers and Filers with Modest Tax
Liabilities, 100 TAX NOTES 723, 723 (2003) (estimating that "almost all" of those who do not file an
income tax return have gross incomes of less than $10,000); Harrington, supra note 39, at 127
(noting the need for heavy penalties to deter the failure of individuals to enroll for services under a




pre-existing condition exclusion and waiting periods, and guaranteed
issue requirements may make it easier to purchase insurance when
needed.64 If the individual does not incur any health care expenses, there
is always the possibility that he or she will not be caught by the tax
enforcement mechanism. And even if caught, because the maximum
penalty after 2008 will be at most 50% of the cost of the premium for the
minimum insurance policy, the individual essentially will end up saving
half of the cost of the health plan premium-not a bad deal, in hindsight,
if no services were needed.
Finally, even if we discount the potential for individual state
residents to make fraudulent or abusive statements regarding their
coverage, the affordability loophole remains a significant impediment to
achieving the goals of the reform plan. Recall that the requirement of
obtaining health care coverage only applies "so long as it is deemed
affordable" by the Connector.65 As Dr. Marcia Angell has argued, if
adequate policies cannot be offered for the relatively low premiums
posited by the drafters of the plan, "this will amount to fining people
because they can't afford health insurance, which, in effect, will punish
them twice. ' ' 66 As both a practical and a moral matter, affordability may
be the exception that swallows the entire reform effort.
2. Employers
The situation is similarly bleak on the employer side. Under the pay-
or-play mandate, if an employer with more than ten employees fails to
make a fair and reasonable premium contribution to a group health plan,
the employer must pay an annual fair share employer contribution of up
to $295 per employee.67  The Director of Labor is instructed to
"implement penalties" for noncomplying providers, although no details
are set out in the legislation.68 In the words of one commentator, this
64. See An Act Relative to Health Care Access, ch. 324, §§ 48, 49, 2006 Mass. Acts
(forthcoming), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sIO60324.htm [hereinafter An
Act Relative to Health Care Access] (designating limits on waiting and pre-existing condition
periods).
65. An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, § 12.
66. Angell, supra note 45.
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(c)(10) (Supp. 2006).
68. Id. § 188(d). By contrast, the statute spells out specific penalties for employers who fail to
timely pay the free rider surcharge when employees who are not offered health insurance use state-
funded free care services. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. II 8G, § 18B(e), (h), (i) (Supp. 2006).
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"assessment is in essence a tax on not offering [insurance, or]...
additional pressure to offer coverage. 69
It is worth noting that there is some debate as to whether the fair
share contribution is properly considered a "penalty" at all. The essence
of a pay-or-play provision is to give the employer a choice: provide
health insurance to your employees, or pay the required amount into a
state fund that will cover their care. In theory, the decision should be
value-neutral-under either path, the employees should receive
adequately funded health care. Thus, rather than functioning as a penalty
for failure to provide health insurance, an employer's payment of the fair
share contribution could be characterized as nothing more than a rational
choice between equivalent alternatives.
7v
From both a practical and a political perspective, however, it seems
difficult to justify this characterization of the Massachusetts law. As a
practical matter, there may be little choice to be made at all: given that
employers often contribute thousands of dollars toward health insurance
premiums for their employees, paying only $295 per employee is a very
good deal. All things being equal, it seems that most employers would
"pay" and very few would "play" under such conditions. Yet if paying is
the most rational option for employers, the contribution was not
calculated in such a way as to make it equally attractive to the state.
Rather than an approximation of the costs of providing insurance to such
employees through the Connector, CCHIP subsidies, and expanded
MassHealth provisions, the contribution is designed to offset a portion of
the costs incurred by the state for care used by the uninsured. 71 As a
result, "this small charge raises less than 5 percent of the total money
spent in the legislation, and reflects more than anything a symbolic
statement that employers should play some role." 72  While perhaps a
rational choice from the employer's perspective, the structure of this
provision appears to be an irrational choice by lawmakers with regard to
the ultimate fiscal consequences.
69. Gruber, supra note 50, at 18.
70. See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Loopholes: Opportunity, Responsibility, or Liability?, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHiCS 320, 323 (2007) (explaining debate).
71. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188 (Supp. 2006) (setting forth methodology for
calculating contribution). The magnitude of the difference can be seen by comparing this amount to
the $1680 per worker contribution that would have been required for employers under the pay or
play provisions of an earlier Massachusetts reform attempt in 1988-eighteen years earlier, in a time
with significantly lower health care costs. See John E. McDonough et al., The Third Wave of
Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform, 2006 HEALTH AFFS.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w420, w420-31
(discussing the 1988 plan and its evolution to the current health plan).
72. Gruber, supra note 50, at 17.
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The characterization is equally implausible from a political
perspective. From even a cursory review of the legislative materials, it is
difficult to characterize the fair share contribution as value-neutral in the
minds of state legislators. It seems clear that the contribution was
viewed by the drafters as a second-best, rather than an equal, alternative
to employer-sponsored insurance. The stated goal of the legislation is
"to expand access to health care for Massachusetts residents." Quite
frankly, it is difficult to see how offering employers the option of paying
only a tiny percentage of their workers' health care costs helps to achieve
that vision.73 Viewed in that light, the $295 contribution is, in reality, a
political compromise among powerful constituencies with the ability to
derail the entire reform effort.
From either perspective, $295 is not much of an incentive for an
employer to provide health insurance, nor will the payments come close
to offsetting the costs of care for the uninsured. The most likely
explanation is that the exigencies of the political process served to reduce
the fair share contribution to a nearly toothless mechanism to induce
employers to offer health insurance to their workers. Even viewed in the
alternative, this pay-or-play provision appears to be a gross
miscalculation of the state's financial needs. In short, the fair share
contribution is simply not fair enough-not enough to sufficiently deter
disfavored behaviors, and not enough to provide the revenue otherwise
needed to achieve the goals of the legislation.
D. Broader Fraud and Abuse Safety Net
Although the anti-fraud provisions in the Massachusetts reform plan
are disappointing in light of the additional problems the legislation is
likely to invite, the anti-fraud situation is not as bleak as it may first
appear. That is because Massachusetts already has in place broad anti-
fraud provisions that will apply to most of the activities undertaken
pursuant to the new programs. For example, the state Medicaid statute
incorporates strong prohibitions on false statements and representations
made in connection with Medicaid benefits (including the failure to
disclose material information), as well as a Medicaid-specific equivalent
to the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.74 While such provisions are fairly
standard, Massachusetts has also enacted less-common versions of these
73. An Act Providing Health Care Access, supra note 42, pmbl.; Conversation with Christie
Hager, Chief Health Counsel, Office of Speaker Salvatore DiMasi, Massachusetts House of
Representatives, on Nov. 10, 2006.
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118E, §§ 39-41 (West 2003).
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laws that apply to private health care insurance, including an anti-
kickback provision, a strong prohibition on false statements in health
care claims and benefits applications, and a private right of action for an
insurer defrauded by health insurance claims containing false
75statements. Moreover, the state's civil false claims provisions are
closely modeled on the federal False Claims Act, including a private
cause of action for qui tam relators.76
Massachusetts is not unique in this regard, but it has long been
considered one of the most active states in the health care fraud arena. In
fact, the Massachusetts false claims provision was the only state law
initially found by OIG to meet the terms of the Deficit Reduction Act,
under which states are entitled to a favorable percentage of Medicaid
fraud recoveries if they have in place a false claims law that is the
equivalent of the federal False Claims Act.77 Thus, in addition to the
unique political, financial, and insurance conditions that made health
care reform possible, Massachusetts also has a more favorable anti-fraud
environment than many other states-raising further questions about the
potential for exporting the Massachusetts approach to other jurisdictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
What does this analysis mean for similar attempts to achieve
universal coverage? To the extent that a market-based approach,
combined with moderate expansions in publicly funded health care
programs, proves to be the only politically feasible strategy for health
care reform at this time, it is likely that both the motivations and the
opportunities for people to engage in fraudulent and abusive activities
will increase. Experience has shown us that it is far better to plan for
these contingencies in advance than to assume, rather naively, that health
care reform efforts will mitigate the temptation to take advantage of the
system. Or, to put it another way, perhaps even health care reform can't
legislate human nature.
75. Id. ch. 175H, §§ 1-3,6 (West 1998).
76. Id. ch. 12, § 5C (West 2002).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(h) (2000) (setting forth Deficit Reduction Act requirements); see also
Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, to Robert Patten, Assistant Attorney General
(Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/falseclaimsact/Massachusetts.pdf
(finding that MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 5 meets the Deficit Reduction Act requirements).
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